复杂适应系统中利益群体的非均衡博弈分析

doi:10.3863/j.issn.1674-5094.2011.03.016

西南石油大学学报(社会科学版) ›› 2011, Vol. 4 ›› Issue (3): 74-79.DOI: 10.3863/j.issn.1674-5094.2011.03.016

复杂适应系统中利益群体的非均衡博弈分析

杨博文马敬辉

西南石油大学文法学院，四川成都 610500

收稿日期:1900-01-01 修回日期:1900-01-01 出版日期:2011-05-20

AN ANALYSIS OF INTEREST GROUPS′ EVOLUTIONARY GAMING IN COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEM

YANG Bo-wen MA Jing-hui

School of Arts and Law，Southwest Petroleum University，Chengdu Sichuan 610500，China

Received:1900-01-01 Revised:1900-01-01 Online:2011-05-20

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 在论述利益群体博弈及其非均衡性的基础上，提出了利益群体非均衡博弈是组织系统的动力之源，分析了利益群体博弈的三种结果：实际值与期望值吻合的均衡博弈；期望值高于实际值的非均衡博弈；实际值高于期望值的非均衡博弈。构建了复杂适应系统中两个利益群体之间的演化博弈模型，进而分析了在复杂适应系统中利益群体的非均衡博弈中，基于初始状态、利益期望值和利益实际值三种因素，利益群体会根据价值创造过程中超额收益与协同成本的关系来选择采取协同方式还是独立运作方式的策略。
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关键词: 复杂适应系统, 利益群体, 非均衡博弈, 协同成本, 组织系统

Abstract: Based on different act choice in value creating sections，the paper builds an evolutionary game model of interest groups in a complex adaptive system，and analyzes its evolutionary stable strategy，probable balanced stages，and the factors which impacting the stable stage.According to this model，the writers figure out that the interest group tend to coordinate with other interest groups during the stages of value creation，and tend to compete with other interest groups during the stage of value allocation.The competition between different interest groups is determined by comparison of competitive income and noncompetitive income.

Key words: complex adaptive system, interest groups, evolutionary gaming, cost synergy, organization system

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