西南石油大学学报(社会科学版) ›› 2014, Vol. 16 ›› Issue (5): 47-51.DOI: 10.11885/j.issn.1674?5094.2014.20137520

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A Study on Illegality Determination of Resale Price Restrictions

ZENG Yang-yang YUAN Kuang-yi   

  1. 1. School of Economic Law, Southwest University of Political Science and Law, Chongqing 401120, China;2. Koguan Law School, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200030, China
  • Online:2014-09-01 Published:2014-09-01

Abstract:

Several major resale prices restrictions cases triggered a fierce debate on its illegality. However, whether it is illegal or not depends on the awareness of the “dual effects” of the resale behavior. Resale price restrictions may lead to producer cartel, retailer cartel, bilateral monopoly of manufacturers and distributors and other negative effects. On the other hand, they have positive effects as to solve the “free rider” problem, eliminate double prices. Therfore regulations on the behavior should be implemented accordingly and careful choice should be made between the per se illegal principle and rational principle. Based on China’s current regulatory model, a “safe harbor” system should be established, exemption clauses should be perfected in order to improve its operating efficiency, thus promoting the progress in price and antitrust enforcement.

Key words: resale prices restrictions, dual effects, per se illegal principle, rational principles, safe harbor, publications