尼克松政府针对沙特的能源外交政策探析

doi:10.11885/j.issn.1674-5094.2018.09.13.02

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 在尼克松政府任内，特别是第四次中东战争爆发前后，美国遭遇了第二次世界大战结束以来首次能源危机。鉴于沙特的石油生产和出口规模，以及其在阿拉伯世界的重要地位和独特影响力，美国在能源安全的供给侧领域，围绕国际大石油公司的参股经营权、解除针对亲以色列的西方工业国集团的石油禁运、国际市场石油交易价格过高三大问题推出了一系列的重大政策。在执行这些政策的过程中，就方式和手段而言，美国往往针对具体问题灵活采取"胡萝卜+大棒"式的软硬兼施策略；在对外宣传方面，美国留给世人的是仁慈霸权性国家的印象，不仅是自身安全和经济利益的保护者，还是西方工业国集团重大利益的守护神。实际上，尼克松时期美国针对沙特的供给侧能源外交政策，始终是在美国利益最大化的指引和管控下有序推进的。

关键词: 尼克松政府, 沙特, 石油禁运, 石油政策, 能源安全

Abstract: During Nixon administration, especially when the 4th Middle-east War broke out, the US encountered the first energy crisis after WWⅡ. Against Saudi Arab's large scale of oil production and export and global influence,the US government implemented a series of supply-side policies by holding shares in major oil companies,by lifting Arab OPEC members' embargo to the US and other countries that supported Israel,and by reducing the soaring oil price. In fighting against the energy crisis,the US employed "carrot and stick" alternatively, and created an image of a nation which protects security and economic interests of both the US and other industrial countries through international communication, although the supply-side energy diplomacy policies were made by the Nixon administration to ensure the optimization of the US national interests.

Key words: the Nixon administration, Saudi Arab, oil embargo, oil policy, energy security

中图分类号:

杨建国. 尼克松政府针对沙特的能源外交政策探析[J]. 西南石油大学学报(社会科学版), 2018, 20(6): 1-12.

Yang Jianguo. Nixon Administration's Energy Diplomacy with Saudi Arab[J]. 西南石油大学学报(社会科学版), 2018, 20(6): 1-12.

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