西南石油大学学报(社会科学版)
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渠章才
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QU Zhang-cai
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摘要：
在非自愿性移民动迁过程中，地方政府的移民动迁机构和非自愿性移民之间存在着激烈的利益博弈。如果政府在利益博弈过程中能够坚持正确的原则，并针对移民动迁过程的不同阶段，采取不同的措施，做到“因时制宜”，不仅有利于双方实现自身理性利益的最大化，促进社会和谐稳定，而且对于加快移民动迁的速度，降低移民动迁的成本，具有不可忽视的作用。
关键词: 自愿性移民, 非自愿性移民, 政府移民动迁机构, 利益博弈规律, 拆迁补偿
Abstract:
In the process of involuntary resettlement，there is an intense benefit game between government agents of immigration relocation and involuntary immigrants. It is quite important for the government to stick to correct principles and to take different measures at different stages during the course of relocation，so as to maximize both parties’ interests and promote social harmony and stability; this also has a significant effect in accelerating and reducing the cost of migration resettlement.
Key words: voluntary immigration, involuntary immigration, government agents of immigration relocation, the rule of benefit game, relocation compensation
voluntary immigration,
渠章才. 论政府在非自愿性移民动迁中的因时制宜[J]. 西南石油大学学报(社会科学版), DOI: 10.3863/j.issn.1674-5094.2013.04.005.
QU Zhang-cai. Suiting Government Measures to Real Conditions in the Involuntary Resettlement[J]. 西南石油大学学报(社会科学版), DOI: 10.3863/j.issn.1674-5094.2013.04.005.
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链接本文: http://journal15.magtechjournal.com/Jwk_xnsk/CN/10.3863/j.issn.1674-5094.2013.04.005
http://journal15.magtechjournal.com/Jwk_xnsk/CN/Y2013/V15/I4/25
