Journal of Southwest Petroleum University(Social Sciences Edition) ›› 2021, Vol. 23 ›› Issue (5): 85-92.DOI: 10.11885/j.issn.1674-5094.2021.04.13.05

• POLITICS AND LAW • Previous Articles     Next Articles

Optimization of the Legal System of Consumer Information Protection in E-commerce——the Game between Business Platform Operators and Consumers

YU Jinxiang1, QI Runfa2   

  1. 1. Gansu Circular Economy and Sustainable Development Legal Research Center, Gansu University of Political Science and Law, Lanzhou Gansu, 730070, China;
    2. Hebei D&A Law Firm, Shijiazhuang Hebei, 050000, China
  • Received:2021-04-13 Online:2021-09-01 Published:2021-09-27

Abstract: Consumer information is constantly at the risk of being illegally acquired and used in E-commerce. Rights and obligations between e-commerce platform operators and consumers are increasingly on an imbalance after the issue of "E-commerce Law". With the help of the "Prisoner's Dilemma" model, we find that one reason consumer information is frequently violated is that the burden of proof system has failed to consider and adjust the weak position of consumers in the game relationship; the other is the lack of mandatory industry self-discipline system, which contributes to the failure to reverse the imbalanced position between e-commerce platform operators and consumers in the game. In order to optimize the consumer information protection system in e-commerce, we suggest applying the principle of inversion of the burden of proof, and giving play to the positive role of the government in promoting enterprise self-discipline.

Key words: consumer information, prisoner's dilemma, non-cooperative game, burden of proof, corporate self-discipline

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