Abstract: The operation of the civil retrial procuratorial suggestion mechanism is centered on the procuratorial organs and courts, and the legislative purpose is to correct erroneous effective civil judgments and achieve fairness and justice in civil litigation. From the perspective of game theory, the legislative evolution from "negotiated supervision" to "legalized supervision" indicates that the relationship between the judiciary and the procuratorate has shifted from a traditional cooperative game to a non-cooperative game. In addition, the cognitive differences in the values and concepts of both parties, conflicts and differences in strategic choices, and poor coordination of operational mechanisms make it difficult for both parties to achieve a "Nash equilibrium" in the game. Instead, they are prone to falling into the "prisoner's dilemma". Setting aside the issues of weakened judicial authority and lack of judicial stability caused by supervision and being under supervision, both parties have a cooperative goal in safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the involved parties and maintaining judicial fairness. In order to promote the transformation of both parties from non-cooperative game to a new type of cooperative game, and to shift the nature of traditional cooperative game from "unilateral dominance" to "win-win for both parties", the procuratorial organs should maintain restraint in supervision, evaluate and refine the measurement standards of the necessity of supervision, and build a positive interactive relationship pattern with the court, so as to improve the procuratorial supervision system of complementary civil retrial procuratorial suggestions and civil protests, and to smooth the coordination mechanism of internal and external operation procedures.

Key words: civil retrial procuratorial suggestion, collaborative governance, cooperative game, non-cooperative game