The Effect of Dividends Paying on the Central Enterprises' Over-investment Behavior under the Semimandatory
Dividend Regulation Policy

Abstract

Abstract:

In recent years, the government and the academic circles pay close attention to corporate over-investment behavior. Under
the semi-mandatory dividend regulation policy, it's an important problem whether the central enterprises' characteristics of dividends
paying has influence on over-investment behavior or not. Based on the data of the central enterprises' A shares in 2012 to 2013, this
research shows that: ① under the semi-mandatory dividend regulation policy, corporate dividend payment rate and over-investment
behavior is negatively related; ②under the semi-mandatory dividend regulation policy, there is a positive correlation between the times of dividend and corporate over investment behavior.

Key words: central enterprises, semi-mandatory dividend regulation policy, dividends paying, over-investment
42

CLC Number:

F276.1：F275

FU Wenyue. The Effect of Dividends Paying on the Central Enterprises' Over-investment Behavior under the Semimandatory
Dividend Regulation Policy[J]. J4, 2015, 14(5): 37-42.

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