西南石油大学学报(社会科学版) ›› 2011, Vol. 4 ›› Issue (3): 74-79.DOI: 10.3863/j.issn.1674-5094.2011.03.016

• 经济学与管理学 • Previous Articles     Next Articles

AN ANALYSIS OF INTEREST GROUPS′ EVOLUTIONARY GAMING IN COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEM

YANG Bo-wen MA Jing-hui   

  1. School of Arts and Law,Southwest Petroleum University,Chengdu Sichuan 610500,China
  • Received:1900-01-01 Revised:1900-01-01 Online:2011-05-20

Abstract: Based on different act choice in value creating sections,the paper builds an evolutionary game model of interest groups in a complex adaptive system,and analyzes its evolutionary stable strategy,probable balanced stages,and the factors which impacting the stable stage.According to this model,the writers figure out that the interest group tend to coordinate with other interest groups during the stages of value creation,and tend to compete with other interest groups during the stage of value allocation.The competition between different interest groups is determined by comparison of competitive income and noncompetitive income.

Key words: complex adaptive system, interest groups, evolutionary gaming, cost synergy, organization system

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