西南石油大学学报(社会科学版) ›› 2014, Vol. 16 ›› Issue (3): 79-83.DOI: 10.3863/j.issn.1674-5094.2014.03.016
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ZENG Xin-ming
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As a marketable system of virtual image, apparent agency causes the lack of information and forms barriers to communication between the principal and relative person, and therefore, brings about great risks. Through an analysis from the perspective of economics and law, we determined that among three parties of apparent agency, the major obligations of preventing risks lie in the relative person. And by Hand formula, it is possible to measure the extent to which the relative person takes his obligations. What’s more, to realize the regulation of apparent agency, the principals and good-intended agents need more self-discipline, and government departments concerned should further improve market circumstances.
Key words: apparent agency, the risk of apparent agency, apparent agent, relative person, Hand formula;
ZENG Xin-ming. The Regulation of Apparent Agency Risks[J]. 西南石油大学学报(社会科学版), 2014, 16(3): 79-83.
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URL: http://journal15.magtechjournal.com/Jwk_xnsk/EN/10.3863/j.issn.1674-5094.2014.03.016
http://journal15.magtechjournal.com/Jwk_xnsk/EN/Y2014/V16/I3/79
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