Abstract: Promoting the construction of beautiful countryside and supplementing the shortcomings of rural environmental governance are the hard tasks of building a well-off society in an all-round way. The introduction of the PPP model provides new options for rural environmental improvement. This article based on the evolutionary game analysis framework, and the symbiosis theory, analyzes the symbiotic conditions of the three parties (local government, social capital, villagers) in rural environmental governance in different scenarios, and tests the basic conclusions with realistic cases. The research suggests that the PPP model is not a panacea, and is highly dependent on the effective governance of the government, and the effective supervision of governments at all levels is especially critical to achieving multi-party symbiosis. Tripartite symbiosis needs to be based on effective government supervision, reduction of the cost of non-compliance with social capital, and benefits to villagers. Also, designing a reasonable punishment mechanism can reduce government inaction and social capital breaches. The evolutionary result will tend to be tripartite symbiosis. Under the circumstances, the compliance of social capital and the permanent participation of villagers are not established; the participation of villagers in environmental governance depends on the net income of participation and has nothing to do with the government rewards received. On this basis, we put forward suggestions for reform of governance methods, improvement of supervision, and for the introduction of third-party pricing and risk compensation mechanisms in order to accelerate the construction of rural organizations and to implement village democracies for rural environmental governance.

Key words: rural environmental governance, PPP model, multiple subjects, capital participation, symbiosis, rural revitalization