Abstract: Focusing on energy supply tensions, we establish models for the design of interruptible energy contract under three information structures. The impacts of relevant factors on the optimal interruptible contract and peak shaving input level and benefits of the supplier are studied. Contract distortion, information rent and information value are discussed. The results indicate that the interruptible contract can motivate industrial users to participate in energy peak shaving, and the supplier prefers to choose industrial users with stronger interruption capabilities and higher peak shaving efficiency and externality. Asymmetric information will not only cause industrial users to reduce peak shaving input level, but also distort optimal interruptible contract. Industrial users can only obtain information rent from interruption capability. When peak shaving efficiency of industrial users is high and the externality of peak shaving auxiliary service reaches a certain threshold, the supplier can obtain higher information value by collecting industrial users' private information related to interruption capability.

Key words: energy peak shaving, interruptible contract, interruption capability, peak shaving input, asymmetric information